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Alter[ing] People's Perceptions: The Challenge
Facing Advocates of Ancillary Business Practices
MARJORIE MEEKS*
There is . a world of objects which have a certain form But
politics, justice .. [t]here's nothing real there, separate from our
perception of them. So if you try to change them, as though there was
something there to change, you'll get frustrated [I]f you don't
know this, you're acting on mistake. Prejudice is the expression of this
rmstake.
If you know this and proceed with humility, you may perhaps alter
people's perceptions so that they behave a little differently at that axis
of behaviour where we locate politics or justice
THE DEBATE
* Philadelphia labor law firm Pechner, Dorfman, Wolffe, Rounck &
Cabot was losing so much business to labor-relations consulting firms that
it recently acquired a Dallas management consulting company A partner
asks: "[I]f I'm hiring a consultant and charging the client for it, why not
acquire a consultant firm that does it?' '2
o "I for one do not feel that it is in the interest of preserving a learned
and caring profession to directly associate the practice of law whatever the
structure with other services." 3
e A law firm in Pittsburgh has turned an operating cost into profit by
offering a duplicating, mailroom and messenger service to tenants in its
building, including other law firms who, according to H. Edward Wesemann
of Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, "use us because we're aware of the problem
of confidentiality. '
4
e "[T]he greater the participation by lawyers in activities other than the
practice of law, the less likely it is that the lawyer can capably discharge
the obligations which our profession demands." '5
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1988,
DePauw Umversity.
1. T. SToPPARD, THE REAL T1NG 53-54 (1984).
2. Stille, When Law Firms Start Their Own Businesses, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 1,
21, col. 1.
3. Gilbert & Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 383, 403 (1988) (quoting Letter from Robert MacCrate to Paul Friedman
(May 14, 1987)).
4. Stille, Outside Ventures Face a Minefield of Ethical Problems, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21,
1985, at 20, col. 1.
5. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALisM To THE BoARD OF GovRS AND THE
House oF DELEGATES OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N, reprnted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 281 (1986)
[hereinafter Stanley Report] (The report of the Commission on Professionalism, discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 11-14, is commonly referred to as the Stanley Report after the
chairman of the Comrmssion and past ABA President Justin A. Stanley.).
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* Borod & Higgins, a thirty-member Memphis firm is now profiting from
charging clients and nonclients to subscribe to their previously complimen-
tary investment banking newsletter and conducting seminars at a cost.
"What we do is closely tied to what we do as lawyers," says Ronald Borod.
"It's not like we went out and opened a haberdashery "6
* "It may be that those who speak in favor of professionalism in the
law reflect a pathetic nostalgia. . But I am unreconstructed. I persist in
perceiving a difference between the lawyer and all tradesmen 7
* Van O'Steen & Partners, the Phoenix personal injury firm that took
the battle over lawyers' advertising to the Supreme Court,' has established
the Van O'Steen Lawyer Marketing Group, which now sells to other law
firms an advertising and marketing program similar to its own. "The
strongest selling feature we have is a track record as a law firm," says
O'Steen.9
* "I know of no lawyer who, on reflection, wishes to equate his
professional obligations to those of the marketplace[,] . no lawyer who
wishes to sell her professional skills as so many potatoes or omons.' ' 10
INTRODUCTION
The recent boom in ancillary business activities, through which large law
firms are forming profitable, controversial-and some would say, unholy-
alliances with nonlawyer professionals, has led to an almost bipolar split
among those who favor and those who oppose the trend. Few are lukewarm
on the subject, especially because ancillary business supporters and critics
are usually neatly aligned along correspondingly opposing sides of today's
debate over the "is" and "ought" of legal professionalism. As the eight
examples above indicate, most ancillary business proponents argue that the
movement will inevitably allow lawyers to improve the services they provide
their clients, while opponents view the trend either as a cause or a symptom
of lawyers' ever-declining ethical standards. Thus, any analysis of the merits
of ancillary business practices forces an examination of fundamental theories
about what a lawyer is or should be.
The trend toward ancillary business practices is still relatively new, which
is perhaps the reason that tolerance of the "other side" is in such short
supply Or maybe a mutual understanding between the two camps, some
common ground of tolerance, will take more than time. Given the intensity,
6. Silas, Diversification, 72 A.B.A. J., May i, 1986, at 17
7 Rifkind, Professionalism Under Siege, II B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 13-14.
8. See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 50 (1977).
9. Stille, supra note 2, at 22, col. 1.
10. D. Block, Report: Ancillary Business Activities of Law Firms 20 n.43 (June 1989)
(copy of unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (quoting Saccomando,
The President's Message, N.Y ST. B.J., Feb. 1988, at 3).
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the personal nature and, so far, the tenacity of most opinions regarding
ancillary business, the only road to accommodating the two disparate views
would seem to entail a careful, honest and objective assessment of the
origins, effects, advantages and dangers of the current trend. This Note
analyzes the two most prevalent and conflicting of the various deeply held
beliefs regarding the proper role of the lawyer. It then attempts to resolve
the conflict between those two beliefs that surrounds the issue of ancillary
business activities.
Part I acknowledges the elusive nature of legal professionalism, which
seems to defy any definition more concrete than each speaker's own per-
ception of it. But, by. generalizing to some degree, two widely held views
can be used as a starting point of inquiry. Part I begins by looking at the
traditional, aspirational view of the profession that has been fostered and,
with mixed success, maintained by the legal ethics codes, particularly Model
Rule 5.4 which prohibits a lay person's partnership in a law firm. That
history stands threatened today, because replacing the traditional perception
in the minds of many lawyers and nonlawyers alike is a second image,
perpetuated recently by the spread of law firm diversification. Ancillary
business activities have fostered the image of the lawyer as a merchant,
selling his problem-solving skills which he tailors to specific clients' needs.
Since so many critics of today's legal profession cite diversification as either
a cause or a symptom of the changes in the profession, Part I finally looks
,at both the current extent of this trend and the impetus behind it.
The facts, figures and catalysts behind the movement, as examined in
Part I, would indicate that ancillary business is changing the face of the
practice of law. In light of this evidence, Part II points out the mistake of
envisiomng a perception-here, legal professionalism-as an object to be
forcibly maintained at some artificial status quo. In fact, if legal ethics
codes are to be honored and enforced, the inevitably changing nature of
the profession would necessitate an adaptation of standards in the area of
ancillary business. Such action would be warranted, however, only if the
benefit of revising the codes would outweigh the damage to the traditions
of the profession.
On this point, the two "sides" necessarily diverge. Ancillary proponents
herald the advantages of the movement, or at least recognize that they
overshadow the drawbacks. They usually favor encouragement, or at least
mimmal regulation of the trend. Opponents, on the other hand, see over-
whelming disadvantages from the relaxation of stnct professional standards
and advocate either stiff regulation or complete prohibition of ancillary
business.
In an attempt- to understand and possibly resolve this fundamental disa-
greement, Part II outlines and evaluates the most common arguments in
favor of amending the codes to accommodate ancillary activities, as well as
the perceived threats that the trend poses for the traditional delivery of
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legal services. It concludes that most of the traditionalists' fears are un-
warranted and are based on a prejudiced perception of the profession as a
static concept. The ethical transgressions they wish to avoid by eliminating
ancillary business-or at least maintaimng Rule 5.4 in its current form-
are either already widespread or are controllable through increased reliance
on other rules and continued commitment to self-government from attor-
neys.
In order for opponents and proponents of ancillary business to work
together to modify Rule 5.4, compromise from both sides is crucial. Tra-
ditionalists would need to yield to some nonlawyer participation or control
in law firms. Diversified firms would need to compromise as well. To prove
their claims that ancillary business need not spell the end of professionalism,
they must adhere to other ethical standards in conducting their ancillary
business if current restnctions are loosened.
This compromise could be reached in countless forms. Part III looks
specifically at two recent proposals for revision of Rule 5.4-the Washing-
ton, D.C. effort, which has recently received official sanction, and the
rejected North Dakota revision. If other states entertain revision of Rule
5.4, they should realize that the Washington, D.C. rule and the North
Dakota proposal represent only two points along a continuum of greater
or lesser nonlawyer influence in diversified law firms.
The nationwide effects of ancillary business are not yet apparent, but for
any states that decide to revise their ethics codes, the challenge will be to
maintain the traditional standards of professionalism while branching out
into ancillary areas. The balancing act is not an impossible one, and the
legal profession need not allow critics' predictions of the end of attorney
self-regulation to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the legal profession
takes care to ensure that ancillary business and dedicated service to the
client are not mutually exclusive, ancillary participants can simultaneously
address the traditionalists' reservations and preserve the bar's cherished
prerogative of self-government.
I. BAsEs OF THE ANCiLLARY BusiNEss CONTROVERSY
A. The Elastic Concept of Professionalism
In August 1986, Justin A. Stanley, then-President of the American Bar
Association and one of the country's most distinguished attorneys, declared
that '[p]rofessionalism' is an elastic concept and any single definition
runs the risk of being too confimng."'' As Chairman of the ABA Com-
mission on Professionalism (the "Stanley Commission"), Stanley was
11. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 261.
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presenting to the ABA House of Delegates and Board of Governors the
most comprehensive evaluation of the legal profession to date. The sixty-
three page report was drafted in response to then-Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger's fear that "the Bar might be moving away from the principles of
professionalism.'1 2 At the outset, the Conmssion admitted its investigation
would be limited to "'perceptions' of American lawyers. 3 They found
this topic "appealing because the word 'perception' recognizes that this
study, with a distinguished panel and thorough as it may be, [was] not
conducive of scientific proof.' ' 14
This dearth of definition, however, does not stem from any lack of
thought devoted to the subject. The identifying characteristics of a profes-
sion, and the legal profession in particular, have been examined by law
professors,'" bar association leaders,16 social scientists17 and partners in the
nation's leading law firms.' Despite the validity of these concerted efforts
12. Id. at 248.
13. Id.
14. Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Profession: Remarks Before the
Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Association, 14 FoiDHAm URa. L.J. 855,
856 (1986).
15. See Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 261-62 (quoting R. PouND, TnE LAWYER FROM
ANTIQuITY TO MODERN Tuis 5 (1953)) ("'The term [profession] refers to a group pursuing
a learned art as a common calling m the spirit of public service-no less a public service
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."').
In addition, New York University Professor Eliot Freidson prepared a definition of the legal
profession for the Stanley Report:
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as exclusive licensing,
that are justified by the following assumptions:
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use of
complex judgments.
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the service, they
must trust those they consult.
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's self-interest is
overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest and the public
good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in such a way as
to assure the public and the courts that its members are competent, do not violate
their client's trust, and transcend their own self-interest.
Id., see also Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQURmy 677, 731 (1989) (Schneyer has pointed out that
the legal profession, when developing the Model Rules, defined itself by an attitude of "overly
determimstic 'role morality' with different sets of guidelines for each role today's lawyers
must play instead of 'ordinary morality,' as some of the critics had prescribed.").
16. See generally Meaning of Professionalism, 1 PROF. LAW 16, 16-17 (1989).
17. Flood, Megalaw and MDPs: UK and US, 9 City of London Solicitors' Company
incorporating the City of London Law Society Newsletter 1, 2 (1989) (copy on file with the
Indiana Law Journal):
What makes a profession distinct is not the vague list of attributes that any
occupation can claim, nor need it be some monopolistic grasp over a particular
segment of the market, but rather the way in which it orgamses its work and
how it defines that work as different from other groups'
18. See D. Block, supra note 10; J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Friedrich, Lawyer-Nonlawyer
Affiliations: A Review of Current Practices and Ethical Issues (Apr. 1989) (copy of unpublished
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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to encapsulate the concept on paper, perhaps the most widely shared view
is that of Thomas S. Johnson, Illinois State Bar Association representative
to the ABA House of Delegates. He finds "[p]rofessionalism . . is difficult
to define, but most lawyers think they know it when they see it."' 9
B. Incongruous Images of the Legal Profession
If legal professionalism, then, is such an ephemeral concept, defined only
by extrinsic evaluation, what do lawyers-and others-see when they "see
it"? Two divergent views seem to be among the most frequent today One
holds that lawyers are umquely obligated citizens with duties not only to
their clients, but to society as a whole and to the admimstration of justice.2
The other is a growing-and possibly conflicting-perception that lawyers
are becoming pragmatic problem-solvers, working alongside other profes-
sionals and treating the client's interests as paramount. 21
1. The Traditional22 Perception of the Legal Profession
a. Roots in the Ethics Codes
After adopting the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908,23 the ABA
added provisions in 1928 prohibiting nonlawyers' financial or managerial
involvement in law 2 Canons 33 through 35, relating to lawyer/nonlawyer
partnerships, were straightforward prohibitions with few available explana-
tions for their adoption. They were strictly construed in the following years
by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics and Grievances to prohibit nearly all forms of
business association between lawyers and nonlawyers that offered legal
19. Johnson, Enhancing Professionalism and Preserving the Independence of the Bar, 75
ILL. B.J. 481 (1987).
20. See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
22. Use of the term "traditional" to describe opimons of the legal profession is not meant
to imply that a certain image is no longer valid or popularly held. To the contrary, many
observers of the profession today subscribe to what this Note refers to as the "traditional"
perception. The terminology is merely used to indicate the contrast between the perception
supported by values stressed in the ethics codes and the perception of those who feel that the
growth of ancillary business activities is detrimentally and irreparably changing the practice of
law.
23. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY
412 (1989). All officially adopted ethics codes mentioned in this Note can be found in this
source.
24. See Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold
Really Make the Rules?, 40 HAsTINGS L.J. 577, 584-85 (1989) (Canons 33-35 discuss lay
involvement).
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services to the public.Y As a whole, the Canons spoke m what the Stanley
Commission correctly deemed "aspirational" terms.2 For example, the
Canons' preamble stated that although a particularized list of obligations
was impossible to compile, lawyers should strive far beyond a mere list of
enumerated duties. 27 For all their lofty talk of preserving the "integrity and
impartiality" of "the system for establishing and dispensing Justice,"2'
however, the Canons were somewhat vague and standardless.
With the 1969 passage of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code"), the ABA attempted to improve on the Canons by pro-
viding more concrete ethical standards. The Model Code was adopted by
almost every state bar association within five years29 and consists of mine
general Canons of behavior, Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations
that elaborate on the Rules m a similar aspirational tone as the earlier
Canons. Unlike the earlier Canons, the Model Code finally offers justifi-
cation for its prohibition of nonlawyer participation m the law. Nonlawyers
are not governed by the same ethical standards as lawyers, and, therefore,
attorneys must be protected from "submitting to the control of others in
the exercise of [their professional] judgment." 30
Despite the Model Code's more explicit ethical guidelines, the legal
community deemed it necessary to act further. United States law schools
increased their focus on ethics in response to a perceived crisis in standards,
and in 1977 the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
was created to remedy the Model Code's possible inadequacies." At the
August 1982 meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, the ABA began
formation of a new ethics code. At this meeting, the Kutak Commission3 2
presented the product of five years' work-its recommendations for changes
25. Id. at 587-88 & nn.64-69.
26. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 257; see also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Canon 32 (1908), in T. MoRGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 421 ("[He advances the
honor of his profession and the best interests of Is client when he renders service tending
to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles
of moral law.").
27. See ABA CANONs oF PRoESSiONAL ETmcs preamble (1908), in T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 412.
28. Id.
29. Andrews, supra note 24, at 588.
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsrpoNsiarrY EC 3-3 (1969), in T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 27.
31. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 258. When the Etlucal Canons stood for 62 years
without revision, why was the Model Code only seven years old at the time work began on
the Model Rules? One commentator suggests "a felt need to shore up the profession's public
image in the wake of the Watergate scandal, in which many lawyers were implicated."
Schneyer, supra note 15, at 688.
32. The Special Committee on Evaluation of Professional Standards was informally referred
to as the Kutak Commission after its chairman, Robert J. Kutak. See Gilbert & Lempert,
supra note 3, at 384.
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to the Model Code.33 The issue of nonlawyer participation, however, was
tabled until the February 1983 meeting, but in the interim, the ABA solicited
and reviewed proposed amendments from interested parties. In February
1983, the ABA continued the debate, 34 and this time the ban on nonlawyer
participation in a law firm was directly addressed dunng discussion of the
Kutak Commission's Proposed Rule 5.4.35
In its proposed version,, the Kutak Commission had refused to automat-
ically perpetuate the old Model Code's assumption that lay involvement
would hamper independent legal judgment. The members of the Comnussion
felt the Model Rules should address perceived changes in the practice of
law. The Commission noted that innovations such as paralegals, private
corporate innng of attorneys and group legal services were all once consid-
ered violations of ethics codes, but have since become widely accepted.36
Nonetheless, the "fear of Sears" ruled the day
One lawyer's famous query whether "this rule mean[s] Sears & Roebuck
will be able to open a law office" and an answer in the affirmative sparked
fear among the delegates. 37 In addition, the Proposed Rule invited delegates
to explore "new methods of providing legal services." '3s This open-ended
suggestion seemed a far cry from the perception of the legal profession
embodied in the 1908 Canons, and the Kutak innovation was short-lived.
The assembly voted to adopt Model Rule 5.4 in a final form39 almost
identical to the old Model Code's provision on independent professional
judgment. Thus, the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct maintained
the ban on partnerships with nonlawyers.
33. See Andrews, supra note 24, at 573.
34. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 390.
35. Andrews, supra note 24, at 593-95. The Proposed Rule stated:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is
held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer acting
in a capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a business corpo-
ration, insurance company, legal services organization or government agency, but
only if:
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by
Rule 1.6;
(c) The organization does not engage in advertising or personal contact with
prospective clients if a lawyer employed by the organization would be prohibited
from doing so by Rule 7.2 or Rule 7.3; and
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
107 REPORTS OF THE ABA 886-87 (1982) (Report of the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards).
36. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 386-87 & nn.7-11.
37. Gibbons, Branching Out, 75 A.B.A. J. 70, 70-71 (Nov. 1989).
38. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 388.
39. MODEL RuLs oF PROFssIoNAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
1038 [Vol. 66:1031
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b. Threats to Tradition
The legal profession today is often accused of a general decline m that
mysterious quality of "professionalism." 40 One typical commentator finds
"[tihe changes wrought have been virtually 180 degrees from the early
canons of lawyer behavior and outlook. .. The decline [in American
lawyers' professionalism] . . is the result of .. lawyers that practice law
as a business rather than as a profession." ' 4' Many of those who would
preserve the profession as envisioned by the framers of the ethics codes see
law firm diversification as the primary threat.42 They fear law firms' widely
offered rationale for ancillary activities-greater service to clients-entails
a dangerous redefing of lawyers' duties. 43 They would agree with the
recommendation of the Stanley Report for the "rekindling of lawyer
professionalism" 44 when it advises lawyers to emphasize "the role of the
lawyer as both an officer of the court and ... of the system of justice"
and to avoid "identifying too closely with their clients." 45
2. The Emerging Perception
Concern is mounting that lawyers are evolving into hired problem-solvers.
Whether or not that role is necessarily inconsistent with the "traditional"
lawyer described above, it does warrant an overview of the proliferation of
ancillary business activities today and an inquiry into the impetus behind
their popularity.
a. The Realities of the Profession
Since the 1983 passage of the Model Rules' restriction on lawyer/nonlaw-
yer partnerships, countless law firms 6 have begun offering nonlaw services
40. See Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 254-63; Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to
a Business, 41 V ND. L. REv. 741 (1988); Brown, supra note 14; Johnson, supra note 19;
Stanley, Lawyers in Business, 8 N. ILL. L. R v. 17 (1987).
41. Brown, supra note 14, at 857-58, 861.
42. See Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 280-81. "The Commission has been disturbed by
increasing participation by lawyers in business activities. [Siome firms now operate
businesses which may provide services that those firms believe are ancillary to the practice of
law " Id. at 280.
43. D. Block, supra note 10, at 19; see also Johnson, supra note 19, at 521 ("[L]awyers
do more than meet the routine legal needs of their clients. [I]t is still lawyers who give
meamng and vitality to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.").
44. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 243.
45. Id. at 278.
46. As of late 1989, an estimated 44 to 62 firms were engaged in nonaw activities, with
nearly 75 percent initiated between 1987 and 1989, and at least 32 other firms were considering
such ventures. Gibbons, supra note 37, at 70, 73. The current number of diversified firms is
increasingly difficult to tabulate, however, as greater numbers of smaller, less conspicuous law
firms branch out into ancillary business.
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through subsidiaries, affiliates or in-house consulting groups. Susan E.
Saltonstall of the Washington, D.C. management consulting firm of Sal-
tonstall and Associates now estimates that the trend may have leveled off,
though only temporarily 47 The highest concentration of such ventures is
among the largest firms in Washington, D.C., where lobbying the federal
government is big business,4 but firms in Boston, New York City, Chicago,
Los Angeles and across the nation have made the move as well. The services
offered by these nonlaw professionals are as diverse as the needs of the
firms' clients, 49 though most firms are involved in no more than two or
three nonlegal areas.
Some firms have elected to keep their nonlawyer professionals in-house,
sometimes designating them as specialists of various kinds, in other cases
setting up internal divisions. Model Rule 5.4(b),s0 however, prohibits non-
lawyers from becormng equity partners in law firms. Thus, these nonlawyers,
who are often among the most talented men and women in their respective
fields, were being denied the security, prestige and voice in running the
firm that partnership brings. In most firms engaged in ancillary business
activities, therefore, the difficulty of integrating large numbers of nonlawyers
into the firm and desigmng lucrative compensation packages for them has
led to a different, and even more problematic, arrangement-ancillary
affiliates."'
47. Saltonstall feels some firms which in the recent past might have diversified without
hesitation are now postponing such moves in the face of the current controversy until the
ABA establishes some guidelines for law firms in this area or takes other definitive action on
the issue. Telephone interview with Susan E. Saltonstall of Saltonstall and Associates (Feb.
28, 1991); see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (containing further discussion of
probable ABA courses of action).
48. Jensen, Ethics Row Looms on Affiliates, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, 28, col. I.
49. See Gibbons, supra note 37, at 73 (chart indicating number of finms involved in 26
different areas of ancillary business, including financial consulting, international trade con-
sulting, lobbying services and health care consulting).
50. MODEL RUns OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1987) ("A lawyer shall not form
a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice
of law.").
51. J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Fnedrich, supra note 18, at 3. The two-hundred plus member
firm of Arnold & Porter of Washington, D.C., one of the leaders in diversification, has
formed APCO, MPC and Associates and the Secura Group.
APCO designs revenue-raising mechanisms for nonprofit organizations
The company, which has 15 employees, also offers lobbying, as well as
finding venture capital investments for corporate clients. On its staff are public
relations specialists, researchers and business school graduates.
The other entity, MPC and Associates functions more like a real estate
development company. MPC, which has a four-person staff of engineers and
real estate professionals, implements some of the projects that APCO dreams
up.
Stille, supra note 2, at 20, col. 1. The Secura Group, an outgrowth of the firm's banking
practice provides strategic planning and management advice to banks, thrifts and credit unions.
Lawrence, Law for the Future, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, 32, col. 1. "'T]hese
1040 [Vol. 66:1031
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Rather than be treated as second-class citizens within the firm, these
professionals have settled into separate organizations of various forms:
partnersips, limited partnerships, corporations or passive investments.
52
Still other firms have simply acquired an existing entity that offers services
helpful to the largest number of the firm's clients. Some firms have even
merged with one of their large, well-established clients. 5
Whenever the ancillary group is a separate entity, however, its manage-
ment will usually be a source of ethical inquiry, centered around Rule 5.4's
prohibitions. Typically, the ancillary group is headed by a governing board
or committee, which is dominated by members of the law firm. This board
also may include key officers or employees of the consulting firm itself
and, occasionally, outside directors. Day-to-day management of the con-
sulting firm is usually vested in nonlawyers, although the key officers may
be lawyers.5 4
These affiliated groups usually work on legal and nonlegal issues for the
firm's established clients. 55 The affiliated nonlawyers can also significantly
contribute to the parent firm through extra business generated by their own
pre-established clients, by attracting their own clients to the firm or simply
from the marketing advantage the firm reaps by its association with a well-
known nonlawyer.
5 6
b. The Forces Behind Ancillary Business
The fact that a large number of law firms are using ancillary businesses
to service their clients does not by itself suggest that lawyers are abandoning
their "traditional" role and "identifying too closely with their clients" 57 as
the Stanley Commission suggested. However, inquiry into the motivating
forces behind the ancillary business trend supports the argument that many
lawyers today are, if not disregarding the profession's responsibilities to the
innovations were driven by the needs of our clients . We saw opportunities to better serve
clients by bringing nonlawyers into our family. We weren't out trying to top anyone else."'
Id. at 32, col. 2 (quoting John Hawke, Jr., partner at Arnold & Porter); see also Fitzpatrick,
Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J.
461, 467-71 (1989) (a thorough description of the interworkings of Arnold & Porter's ancillary
business groups from an insider, partner James F. Fitzpatrick).
52. J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Friedrich, supra note 18, at 3-4.
53. Haserot, Multiprofessional Mixes Are Proliferating, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 16,
18, col. 1.
54. J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Friedrich, supra note 18, at 4.
55. Id.
56. Haserot, supra note 53, at 16, col. 1.
57. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 278; cf. Rooney, Report on Professionalism; the ABA
Attempts Suicide, 75 Ini. B.J. 480, 526 (1987) ("Mhe comnussion concludes that the duty of
lawyers to the system transcends their duty to their clients when there is a conflict between
the two. . inhere is no authority for such a proposition. The suggestion would probably
come as a major shock to most practicing attorneys.").
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justice system, at least shifting their focus of concern from their profession's
image to their client's needs.
Law firms began hinng nonlegal personnel twenty years ago, and now
paralegals, investigators and other paraprofessionals have become standard
fixtures in both large and smaller firms.5" In addition, over the last ten
years, the more lucrative practice areas of large firms, such as regulated
industries and antitrust law, were effectively outmoded by deregulation and
increased acceptance of business combinations. 9 Firms initially, therefore,
turned to outside business activities to compensate for the lost revenue and
then maintained those practices even after recovenng from the immediate
financial crunch.
Today, as the practice of law has become even more complex, both
attorneys and their clients are realizing that many specific jobs within larger
projects must be handled by other professionals if the firm is to achieve
the most effective and cost-efficient results for its clients. 6° For example, a
comprehensive report on ancillary business, submitted to the ABA by several
large firms involved m the trend,61 points to today's real estate transactions.
What once would have required only a working knowledge of contract and
property law now entails "environmental science or engineenng, tax and
zoning issues, intricate financing arrangements, questions of insurance and
professional liability, and so on." '62
In addition to using nonlegal professionals to help them resolve complex
legal issues, lawyers often need extra-legal advice as well. Seven years ago,
for example, Houston's Fisher, Gallagher, Pernn & Lewis hired an engineer
to advise the firm's attorneys on where to focus their legal analysis of
technically intricate complaints. Thus, their attorneys are freed from as-
sessing the inscrutable technicalities and can sell the client a more time-
efficient result.63 Similarly, Harvard Professor of Law David Wilkins notes
that, in increasing numbers today, "[c]lients want more than just legal
advice-they want business advice."' 4 Responding to such needs, several
firms have formed affiliates with financial planning or investment consult-
ants to provide clients with such advice.
Besides their clients' needs, however, many firms also may have their
own survival increasingly in mind. With the financial squeeze facing most
58. J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Fnedrich, supra note 18, at I.
59. D. Block, supra note 10, at 6.
60. Is Ancillary Business the Future?, 1 PRoF. LAW I (Summer 1989).
61. Id. The ABA Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism, while studying
ancillary business in 1988, solicited opimons on the subject from ABA entities and large law
firms. The article is the response by a group of large firms involved in ancillary business.
62. Id.
63. Lauter, 'Outsiders' Who Work for Firms, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 1, 32, col. 2.
64. Rothfeld, Law Firms Moving Rapidly into New Businesses, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1989,
at B5, col. 5.
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firms today,65 past ABA President Justin A. Stanley finds "it is perhaps
not surprising to see the entry of law firms into businesses." 66 Houston law
firm consultant William Cobb concurs, listing the rising price of legal
services and competition for- clients as the primary forces behind ancillary
business. 67 The traditional ethics codes, however, and Model Rule 5.4 in
particular, present barriers to firms working with nonlawyers and billing
those services to clients. Although these restrictions may make firms hesitant
to diversify, observers like Cobb see no other lucrative solution to financial
difficulties as partners' hourly rates increase and other consulting companies
draw business away from the legal profession."
Quite apart from the aspirational argument that allowing ancillary activ-
ities will benefit the client-or the more straightforward motivation of
financial survival-there is also an issue of fairness, or symmetry, involved.
Accounting firms have long been hiring attorneys to work in what is usually
called the firm's "tax department." If these lawyers merely advised the firm
on its own legal problems, no one could argue. But they often perform
legal services such as interpreting tax statutes for the firm's clients, and
some eventually become principals of the accounting firm. This practice
would seem to be in direct conflict with the Model Rules' prohibitions on
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships, yet efforts to enforce the rules have been
few.69 One possible reason for this oversight in enforcement seems to be
the realization that this type of comfortable, efficient multi-disciplinary
relationship is just the type that should be allowed.
II. ACCEPTANCE oF ANCILLARY BusnEss REAITms
A. Reactions to the Inevitable
Whatever the catalysts behind ancillary busmess-services, finances or
fairness-more and more firms may be feeling the push to diversify. District
of Columbia management consultant Susan E. Saltonstall finds that the
financial, legal, and even social climate inducing the nation's largest firms
to diversify is inevitably affecting smaller firms as well because their market
65. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 259.
66. Stanley, supra note 40, at 27.
67. Lauter, supra note 63, at 32, col. 1.
68. Id., see also Rothfeld, supra note 64, at B5, col. 5 (quoting David Wilkins, professor
at Harvard Law School) (.'It's increasing competition for legal business and increasing
competition between lawyers '); Stille, supra note 2, at 22, col. I (H. Edward Wesemaan
of Pittsburgh's Thorp, Reed & Armstrong says, "Clients look at the total bill, not just the
legal bill. We think [our ancillary business] gives us an edge.").
69. Andrews, supra note 24, at 635; see also Andrews, supra note 24, at 632-37 (a thorough
discussion of possible justifications for the nonenforcement of the Rules' prohibitions in this
context).
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share is being taken up by other professions. 70 She tells her clietts who are
law firms, "Whether you have a subsidiary or not, the profession has
changed. You have to think like a businessman even though you still have
to be a very good lawyer."7 1 In fact, The National Law Journal recently
ran an article sounding more like an overzealous recruiting officer than an
advice column on firm management. The writer declared that "[a]ny law
firm with more than 40 lawyers, and certainly with more than 150 lawyers,
should analyze the potential of [diversifying itself in a nonlaw subsidiary],"
and he promised benefits such as strategic market positioning, new client
contacts, cross-selling potential and higher partner profits. 72
The ancillary business trend has been described as "synergistic" and a
logical evolution of practice.73 Law firms' operating costs-such as adver-
tisement, rent and competitive salaries to attract new hires-are increasing
faster than attorneys' hourly rates. 74 Thus, firms struggle to attract more
clients and then attempt to diversify to serve them more efficiently. But
this expansion increases costs still further while at the same time the swelling
number of lawyers lowers hourly rates.75 "The bar might stop it for a
while," says University of Illinois Professor of Law Ronald Rotunda
regarding diversification, "[b]ut the economic pressures are [all] in favor
of allowing this sort of arrangement. 7 6
As this Note has detailed, lawyers currently work side-by-side with non-
lawyers in arrangements that differ from equity partnerships in name only,7
and this state of affairs seems in little danger. Still, Model Rule 5.4 has
been "stubbornly resistant to change, 78 as have the perceptions of the legal
profession held by many of those most able to influence the course of the
profession. Even when presented with such a carefully tailored and thought-
ful alternative as the Kutak version of Model Rule 5.4, the ABA declined
the opportunity to relax its prohibitions against nonlawyer participation.
This attitude seems even less practical now than it did at the 1983 convention;
now that so many law firms have already diversified, ignoring or repressing
ancillary business practices would seem an imprudent course.
70. For example, Saltonstall reports that "accounting firms do state sales and use tax
business now. And a small telecommumcations boutique firm I counsel has lost business to
engineers and others because of the perception that consultants in [the telecommunications]
area can do just what attorneys do." Telephone interview with Susan E. Saltonstall of
Saltonstal and Associates (Feb. 28, 1991).
71. Id.
72. McCrensky, Non-Law Subsidiaries Can Benefit Many Firms, Nat'l L.J., July 17, 1989,
at 17, col. I.
73. Marcus, Lawyers Branch Out from the Law, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1986, at Al, A17,
col. 1.
74. Ballard, Looking Outside for More Business, 119 N.J.L.J. 625, 647 (1987).
75. Id.
76. Rothfeld, supra note 64, at B5, col. 6.
77. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
78. Andrews, supra note 24, at 600.
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Currently, the Model Rules are attempting to perpetuate one version of
legal professionalism. However, they mistakenly treat that concept as one
particular, static object rather than as the collection of divergent, evolving
perceptions which this Note suggests. A partner in one of the largest
diversified firms suggests, "I think the opponents have taken this position
more as a matter of theology than rationality. They have a narrow and
rigid view of what it is to be a lawyer. ' 79 Those who attempt to perpetuate
such an inviolate perception of the profession are bound to be frustrated,
and their rules are bound to be ignored m both spirit and practice.
The ultimate aim of any professional code should not be to blindly
advocate one permanent set of values and force the actions of the profes-
sionals into those boundaries. A changing professional climate would dictate
that the standards of the profession adapt. On the other hand, rules must
not be carelessly discarded simply because of increasing infractions of their
spirit. In some instances, instead of revising rules, those in charge of
enforcing them should simply exert stronger efforts. Thus, before the current
codes are discounted as remnants of an outdated perception of the profes-
sion, either their rationales must be rejected, or substantial advantages must
arise from their revision. The next section of this Note, therefore, assesses
the benefits and disadvantages to the profession of ancillary business prac-
tices.
B. Reassessing the Impact of Ancillary Business
on the Profession
When evaluating any revision of current ethics codes, both the traditional
and emerging perceptions of the profession should be considered. Presum-
ably, the adherents to the traditional viewpoint will generally favor some
restriction on diversification, and those who follow the emerging perception
will prefer expansion of the codes to accommodate ancillary business. But
in order to accurately and honestly measure the gain or loss to the profession
from revision of the codes, even the most closely held viewpoints must be
left open to the possibility of reassessment.
79. Telephone interview with James F Fitzpatrick, partner at Arnold & Porter (Jan. 25,
1991). District of Columbia management consultant Susan E. Saltonstall suggests that this
"rigid view" may be as much a product of self-preservation as self-righteousness. She often
encounters resistance from clients whom she counsels to consider diversification. "Many lawyers
are simply more comfortable looking for a needle m a haystack rather than exercising their
interpersonal skills as much as businessmen have to-and that's definitely not a bad thing.
Many lawyers are lawyers because they didn't want to be businessmen. They chose to- go to
law school and not to business school." Telephone interview with Susan E. Saltonstall of
Saltonstall and Associates (Feb. 28, 1991).
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1. Erosion of the Traditional Profession Due to Ancillary
Business and the Necessity of Current Restrictions
Ancillary business activities could be called either a cause or a symptom
of other recent developments in the legal profession. But whatever the causal
relationship, law firm diversification has been unceremoniously lumped
together with several other phenomena which have had unpopular effects
on the legal profession: the sharply increasing number of practicing lawyers,
stiffer competition, more solicitation and advertising, increasing fees and
billable hours and decreasing quality of services.80 Perhaps because of this
unpopular company, outcry concering the dangers of ancillary business
activities has been considerable. Some of the most frequent complaints are
these: lawyers will sacrifice their independent judgment, the quality of legal
services will decrease as lawyers' time is consumed in other ventures, law
will become a business rather than a unique profession, a lawyer's loyalty
to is client and the firm's subsidiary will clash, clients will be misled as
to the legal expertise of nonlawyers in law firms, financial scandals and
disciplinary actions against attorneys will draw negative press leading to loss
of the public's trust, and these crises will culminate in the government's
justified interference in the profession's right to self-government.
Despite this lengthy list of concerns, however, the opposition to ancillary
business was not organized until 1988 when the ABA Special Coordinating
Committee on Professionalism requested input and opinions from interested
parties."1 Then, both proponents and opponents were motivated to put their
respective arguments in writing. The Chair of the ABA Litigation Section's
Ancillary Business Committee, Dennis J. Block of Weil, Gotshal & Manges
in New York, seemed to represent well the concerns of those who view the
legal profession as uniquely obligated and privileged.82 He joined two other
lawyers in predicting that increased ancillary business would lead to nu-
merous pitfalls, chiefly a redefining of the legal profession, the loss of self-
governing ability by the bar and countless conflicts of interest. 3 For example,
if a firm's client asked a lawyer about the legal or ethical validity of a
recommendation which the consulting affiliate gave the client, would the
lawyer be able to respond candidly? And if an affiliated consulting group
encountered a legal issue raised by one of its client's problems, would
referral of the client to the parent firm be improper solicitation?"
80. D. Block, supra note 10, at 2.
81. See supra note 61.
82. D. Block, A. Roth & G. Meerhofer, Lawyers and Ancillary Business Activities: An
Overview of the Ethical Problems (May 1989) (copy of unpublished manuscnpt on file with
the Indiana Law Journal).
83. Id. at 4-16.
84. See MODEL RuLzs OF PROFEssIONA CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1989).
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However, the most relevant viewpoint on the subject today is that of the
American Bar Association, because it alone is empowered to modify the
Model Rules, from which the states principally take their cues in formulating
their own ethics codes. The ABA made its position clear when the District
of Columbia Bar began seriously considering a revised version of Model
Rule 5.4 and North Dakota came close to adopting verbatim the Kutak
Commission's 8 version.16 The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility
responded to those two developments with a memorandum on the policy
behind Model Rule 5 .4.87 According to the report, the Rule was intended
to control four problem areas: the unauthorized practice of law, confiden-
tiality, independent professional judgment and advertising and solicitation.8
The four concerns of the ABA, however, can all be discounted as long
as the other Model Rules addressing those four issues89 continue to be as
stringently respected and enforced as they now are through ethics committee
opinions and attorney self-government. First, the ABA feared that nonlawyer
investors in law firms might require the firm's nonlawyer personnel-such
as senior lay advocates or legal interns-to employ standardized forms for
wills or real estate contracts without final attorney supervision." However,
the ABA failed to acknowledge that the same risks are posed when paralegals
employ standardized forms, and that no demonstrable harm to the public
has ever resulted from that practice.91 In addition, unauthorized practice
rules, which m some jurisdictions even carry criminal penalties, 92 are avail-
able to sanction nonlawyers who might overstep any boundary-or lawyers
who would encourage them to do so.
The ABA's concern over confidentiality holds even less weight, because
nonlawyers in law firms are exposed to client confidences almost every day.
The only additional risk that ancillary business would pose is that nonlawyer
interest-holders might force attorneys to disclose clients' secrets. For in-
stance, the ABA feared a nonlawyer board of directors might insist on
using confidential client information in devising corporate strategy, 93 but
this question has been laid to rest by the ABA Ethics Committee. Although
the question addressed by the Committee was not identical to the concern
85. See supra note 35.
86. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 403.
87. ABA Memorandum Subject: Model Rule 5.4 (Professional Independence of a Lawyer)
7-8 (Apr. 22, 1987) (unpublished memorandum available from the ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility in Chicago) [hereinafter ABA Memorandum Subject: Model Rule 5.4].
88. Id.
89. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFE sIONAL CONDUCT Rules 5.5, 1.6(a), 2.1, 7.1-7.3 (1989) (The
Rules listed, respectively, hold lawyers to standards set by the ABA in the areas of unauthorized
practice, confidentiality, independent professional judgment and advertising and solicitation.).
90. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 404.
91. Id.
92. Andrews, supra note 24, at 604.
93. ABA Memorandum Subject: Model Rule 5.4, supra note 87, at 7
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raised here, the reasomng can be applied to deny confidential access to
nonlawyer boards of directors and m other similar situations. 94 In addition,
a rule is already in place to address the issue; attorneys are obligated to
insure their nonlawyer assistants' behavior is "compatible" with a lawyer's. 9
The most obvious response to the ABA's concern over preserving lawyers'
independent professional judgment in the face of economic pressure is that
the ABA is too late. Lawyers' increasing emphasis on the bottom line has
been noted and criticized for several years. 9" But the ABA assumes that the
monetary temptation to sacrifice quality work for quantity will automatically
increase with the advent of nonlawyer management. This view unreasonably
implies that lay managers are unable either to comprehend or to respect the
ethical obligations that the codes impose on lawyers. Such a rationale also
assumes that nonlawyer control will necessarily be more influential and
more inherently unprincipled than, for example, the control a partner could
assert over salaried associates in her firm.Y In short, there are many more
ominous threats to a lawyer's ethical and financial independence than a
nonlawyer partner.
Finally, the ABA is concerned about advertising, which they imply would
be initiated at the behest of pernicious nonlawyer managers. This merely
echoes the numerous objections the ABA had toward lawyer advertising
before the Supreme Court settled the issue in Bates v. Arizona State Bar,9"
when it upheld the first amendment rights of attorneys to advertise. Any
ABA concerns, therefore, seem belated and irrelevant as the standards for
attorney advertising are continually loosened. However, any revised ethics
code that acknowledges and permits ancillary business would continue to
include provisions requiring all legal advertising to conform to the relevant
standards of each jurisdiction."
2. Benefits to the Emerging Legal Profession from Relaxing
Current Restrictions on Ancillary Business
When partners in diversified law firms list the benefits ancillary business
activities bring to the profession and to its customers, they usually speak
of better service to those clients who come to them with problems involving
several disciplines.' ° Arnold & Porter's managing partner James Jones
94. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 344, at 7 (1974)
(emphasis added) ("[T]he obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of clients
applies to statements to and information conveyed to any other person or body not privy
to lawyer-client relationship.").
95. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1983).
96. See supra note 40 (sources cited therein).
97. See generally Andrews, supra note 24, at 605-11.
98. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1-7.5 (1983).
100. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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explains the ways in which ancillary business practices enable these firms
to better serve their clients: "Increasingly, . . the distinction between what
is a 'strictly legal' issue and what is not is often quite blurred. .. Today's
lawyer is almost as likely to be focusing on economic, scientific, financial
or political questions as on strictly legal issues."' 01 If lawyers cannot identify
or cannot adequately analyze the nonlegal issues within a client's problem,
then the nonlawyer steps in. Ancillary business organizations are also more
convement, both for lawyers and their clients. When the members of the
team engaged on a certain case are all m the same office or under common
management, the logistics are easier for everyone involved, and the client
need not look to any other organizations for further service.
By prohibiting lawyers from forming partnerships with nonlawyers, how-
ever, the current rules hamper this type of productive interaction. They
discourage the most talented nonlawyers from joining law firm affiliates by
preventing them from attaining equal status with attorneys. °2 In order to
acquire the services of nonlawyer professionals, therefore, most diversified
firms have constructed affiliates rather than hiring rn-house consultants.
The affiliate approach, however, entails significant financial risks and start-
up costs. 03 Many smaller firms are effectively shut out of the affiliate scene
because they lack the resources to absorb such risk. Neither can they afford
to construct a facade of "'elaborate bookkeeping and separation [of firm
from lay affiliate] which, of course, is done for precisely the ethical code
reasons .... "' 10 4 Smaller firms, then, would benefit from an amendment
to the rules wich would permit them to attract nonlawyers as equity
partners instead of as in-house hires or affiliates.
Another benefit of relaxed restrictions on partnerships with nonlawyers
would be the increased acceptance of "professional" law firm managers.
Growing numbers of large and nud-sized firms are already employing these
lay people who offer specialized business or organizational training. The
efficiency and skill of these lay employees spare firms the loss of a senior
partner's billable hours spent on management, and the work can be done
more consistently than if it were rotated among several partners.
Finally, allowing nonlawyer professionals to become partners in law firms
would alleviate some of the possible negative effects of ancillary business.
101. Gibbons, supra note 37, at 72.
102. Andrews, supra note 24, at 624-25 n.243.
103. Stile, supra note 2, at 1, col. 4 ("Law partnerships, which normally divvy up all the
net income at the year's end, can be torn apart when the shares are sapped by start-up costs
or losses from an outside venture. The impact is greatest on the younger partners whose shares
are smaller.").
104. Andrews, supra note 24, at 627 (quoting remarks by Stephan Brill in Transcript of
Proceedings of Conference Sponsored by the Amnencan Lawyer, The 80"s Shakeout: An Update
381 (June 1, 1987)).
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Every dollar saved by streamlining routine jobs and replacing redundant
affiliate management with in-house procedures could presumably be chan-
neled back to the firm, thus lifting some of the economic pressures that
threaten to compromise the quality of lawyers' independent judgment and
service to clients.105
III. THE NE EssITY OF COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION
OF ANCILLARY BusINEss
The preceding assessment of the overall effects of ancillary business on
the profession should make the image of lawyers as hired problem-solvers
seem more appealing to traditionalists. They should recognize nonlawyer
partnership as. a path, to more effective and efficient client service and a
partial solution to some firms' financial difficulties. Ancillary advocates,
however, should be reminded that a modification of Rule 5.4 would not be
license to disregard the remaining rules and standards which prohibit those
ethical transgressions often associated with ancillary business. They should
also recognize the corresponding need for increased diligence in the profes-
sion's tradition of self-government, which would in turn reassure those still
hesitant to condone diversification.
Necessarily, any meeting of the minds or a decision to modify Model
Rule 5.4 would require some type of compromise between ancillary pro-
ponents and opponents. Countless forms of Rule 5.4 would be workable
depending on the compromise struck, and the degree of nonlawyer influence
in law firms that any revision allowed would dictate the corresponding
degree of conciliation necessary from ancillary opponents. The District of
Columbia has provided an example of one feasible alternative, while the
state of North Dakota provides an example of an unsuccessful experiment
in that area.
However, all the necessary compromises on the ancillary business issue
need not come from the opponents' side. For example, a proposed revision
which allowed nonlawyers carte blanche in their managerial or financial
activities within law firms would likely be rejected even by some revisionists.
But whatever alternative is finally agreed upon, ancillary proponents must
continue to practice law in the spirit of professionalism which the remaining
rules require if they want the continued cooperation and support of tradi-
tionalists after the pertinent rules are revised.
A. Revisionist Efforts to Date
1. Taking the Lead in Washington, D.C.
For purposes of analysis, this Note has spoken of revision of Model Rule
5.4 only as a contingency, but as of January 1, 1991, change has become
105. Id. at 627-29. If nonlawyer private investments were allowed, firms could avoid extensive
borrowing to raise capital. Id. at 629-31.
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a reality for the legal profession m Washington, D.C. On March 1, 1990,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a version of Rule 5.4
allowing nonlawyers to hold a partnership interest in, a law firm as long as
their activities assist the firm in "providing legal services to clients." 10 6
106. The text of the new rule is as follows:
Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer.
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's fim, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after
the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of
the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the
deceased lawyer;
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation
or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-
sharing arrangement; and
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted m a partnership or other form of organization
which meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law m a partnership or other form of orgamzation
in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the organ-
ization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial
interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;-
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer par-
ticipants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule
5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
Rules of Professional Conduct, D.C. Cr. R. ANN. Rule 5.4 (adopted) (Mar. 1, 1990).
Relevant comments to Rule 5.4 provide:
[3] As the demand increased for a broad range of professional services from a
single source, lawyers employed professionals from other disciplines to work for
them. So long as the nonlawyers remained employees of the lawyers, these
relationships did not violate the disciplinary rules. However, when lawyers and
nonlawyers considered forming partnerships and professional corporations to
provide a combination of legal and other services to the public, they faced serious
obstacles under the former rules.
[7] As the introductory portion of paragraph (b) makes clear, the purpose of
liberalizing the rules regarding the possession of a financial interest or the exercise
of management authority by a nonlawyer is to permit nonlawyer professionals
to work with lawyers in the delivery of legal services without being relegated to
the role of an employee. For example, the Rule permits econoimsts to work in
a firm with antitrust or public utility practitioners, psychologists or psychiatric
social workers to work with family law practitioners to assist in counseling clients,
noalawyer lobbyists to work with lawyers who perform legislative services,
certified public accountants to work in conjunction with tax lawyers or othirs
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The rule adopted by the court allows law firms in D.C. to hire nonlawyer
partners only if the firm's "sole purpose [is] providing legal services to
clients." The rule is similar, but not identical, to a version proposed in
1985 by the District of Columbia Bar Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Committee that was closer to the 1983 Kutak proposal.107 The court's
revisions to the Committee's proposal were protested in a December 1988
letter to the court signed by several prominent members of the District of
Columbia legal community-but to no avail.m
The attorneys protested what they called the court-adopted "artificial
compliance standard" as too confusing in its use of ambiguous terms such
as "sole" and "legal services"'' 9 and argued that firms wishing to form
ethically acceptable ancillary business associations would be left without
clear guidance. They also felt the rule mandated inconsistent treatment of
different ancillary business ventures based only on the ventures' structures
and not on any inherent ethical difference in their forms." 0 For example,
the rule implies that an independent nonlaw subsidiary would be acceptable
while an in-house consulting group would not.
Thus, even before the new rule was adopted, its content was a source of
controversy, and further conflict may follow. Just as the rule is too
restrictive to please some diversified firms, criticism of the rule from
traditionalists can also be expected. In addition, the D.C. court's ruling
seems to ignore the ABA's long-standing policy against lawyer/nonlawyer
partnerships. The rule came less than a month after a report issued by the
ABA Litigation Section's Task Force on Ancillary Business which explicitly
opposed such partnerships and in fact "urge[d]" adoption of rules forbid-
ding them."
who use accountants' services in performing legal services, and professional
managers to serve as office managers, executive directors, or in similar positions.
In all of these situations, the professionals may be given financial interests or
managerial responsibility, so long as all of the requirements of paragraph (c) are
met.
Id. comment.
107. See supra note 35.
108. Letter of Arnold & Porter; Brownstein, Zeidman and Schomer; Collier, Shannon, Rill
& Scott; Howrey & Simon; Kaplan, Russin & Vecchi; Miller & Chevalier; Nixon, Hargrave,
Devans & Doyle; Verner, Lipfert, Bernhard & McPherson; and Wickwire, Gavin & Gibbs to
the D.C. Court of Appeals (Dec. 1, 1988) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 3. A variation on this basic "fairness" argument is commonly heard from
ancillary advocates in other jurisdictions across the country. Currently, many state ethics codes
treat various lawyer/nonlawyer practice arrangements with similar functions quite differently,
and bar association ethics opimons do not always bear out their strict language with strict
enforcement of the business codes. Andrews, supra note 24, at 631-32.
Ili. D.C. Rule Intensifies Debate over Non-Lawyer Partners, 1 PROF. LAw 1, 19 (1990).
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The Litigation Section's position on nonlawyer partnerships, however,
does not reflect the views of the entire ABA. According to Bryant Garth,
director of the American Bar Foundation, the research arm of the ABA,
"the ABA is just crippled because there are such differing opimons among
the many sections. The Litigation Section is so opposed, but the solo
practitioners and others are in favor. No one wants to touch [the issue] on
the floor of the House of Delegates. 1 1 2 No substantive action was taken
on the issue at the ABA's annual meeting in August 1990, but at the
February 1991 mid-year meeting the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility solicited comments on its proposed draft of
revised Model Rules, which, if adopted, would represent the ABA's official
recommendation on the subject to jurisdictions around the country.1 The
issue was not before the House of Delegates in February, however, and the
Committee accepted further input from various interested groups until
March 25. The Committee will file their final recommendation with the
House of Delegates by June 1 as is required for inclusion on the agenda
of the August 1991 annual meeting, the next opportunity for any definitive
action on either the new rules or the ancillary business issue in particular. 1 4
How recent events, both those m the capital and within the ABA, will
effect lawyers and clients in the rest of the country remains to be seen, but
any nationwide repercussions of the D.C. move will likely be gradual, on
a state-by-state basis. Currently, Washington, D.C. is the undisputed center
of ancillary business activity, so official acceptance of the practice there is
hardly surprising. But so far, the orgamzed bar of only one jurisdiction
besides the District of Columbia has seriously entertained the idea of
allowing nonlawyer partnerships-and there unsuccessfully.
2. Experimenting in North Dakota
The 1983 Kutak proposal made quite a favorable impression on the
Professional Conduct Study Subcommittee of the Attorney Standards Com-
mittee of North Dakota when that state was considering adoption of the
112. Telephone interview with Bryant Garth (Jan. 22, 1991). See generally Debate Continues
on Lawyers' Role in "Ancillary" Businesses, 2 PRop. LAw. 1, 1-20 (1990).
113. The proposed rules represent the synthesis by the Committee of observations and
recommendations from several sources, principally including the Final Report of the Working
Group of the ABA Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism on the Ancillary
Business Activities of Lawyers and Law Firms (with a concurrence and lengthy dissent) (Nov.
1990) and the Special Report of the ABA Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism
to the House of Delegates on Ancillary Business Activities of Lawyers and Law Firms (with
a concurrence in part/dissent in part) (Dec. 1990). Telephone interview with Mark Harrison,
partner at Harrison, Harper, Christian & Dichter and Chairman of the Special Coordinating
Committee on Professionalism (1987-89) (Jan. 23, 1991).
114. Telephone interview with Arthur Garwm, Assistant Professionalism Counsel of the
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility (Jan. 23, 1991).
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new Model Rules in 1986. A rule very similar to Kutak's was proposed as
North Dakota's Rule 5.4 and included in the model rule package which the
subcommittee submitted to the rest of the state. A vote of state bar members,
the bar's Board of Governors, and the Attorney Standards Committee
indicated widespread initial support for the revision.
In the state supreme court, however, the proposal was rejected with little
comment, and the ABA's version of the Model Rules was adopted in April
1987.115 According to the assistant state court administrator for the North
Dakota Supreme Court, the ruling may have been in reaction to negative
national press suggesting ill effects from adoption of the proposal. Further
attempts to reopen the issue are thought to be unlikely in the near future.16
B. Suggestions for the Future
1. Alternative Ancillary Structures
If any other jurisdictions do give serious thought to the ancillary business
issue, what options-besides the D.C. rule and the ABA's blanket prohi-
bition-are available for their consideration and what would be the ranu-
fications of their choices? Susan Gilbert, ethics counsel to the D.C. bar,
and Larry Lempert, executive editor at Prentice Hall Law and Business m
D.C., see the possibilities as a "spectrum" of differing degrees of nonlawyer
involvement.117
For example, at one end are the ABA's Model Rules which prohibit
nonlawyer managerial or financial participation in a law firm. Less strict is
the new D.C. rule which allows nonlawyer managerial or financial interest
in an entity only if the nonlawyer provides professional services which assist
the entity in providing legal services and the entity delivers solely legal
services. The next step would be to allow that entity to engage in client
services other than the practice of law Finally, under a rule furthest removed
from Model Rule 5.4, the nonlawyers would not be required to even
participate actively in the entity but could enter strictly as investors.118 Tis
final alternative includes another spectrum of possibilities. The rule could
allow nonlawyers free reign, it could limit nonlawyer investment to keep
financial control in the hands of the firm's lawyers, or it could set nonlawyer
participation at any level in between. 1 9 Gilbert and Lempert urge jurisdic-
tions to examine some of these midrange options instead of refusing to
115. Gibbons, supra note 37, at 73; see also Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 400-03
(contaimng a thorough discussion of the proposal's rejection).
116. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 3, at 402.
117. Id. at 409.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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address the issue simply because they fear the prospect of overwhelming
nonlawyer control that "sent the ABA House of Delegates running to the
far end of the spectrum, an absolute ban." 120
Obviously, the widespread results of revision can be only speculative as
of now. They will vary with the form of Rule 5.4 chosen, with the area of
the country where the change is implemented and according to which body
is the source of the revision. But so far, no empirical evidence exists
suggesting that permitting lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships will actually result
in the harms the ABA has predicted. In fact, case law in the similar area
of unauthorized practice indicates no significant harm to the public interest.12 '
2. Vigilant Self-Regulation
There is one result of increased ancillary business, however, that its
opponents may have good reason to fear, if care is not taken. Some critics
argue that proliferation of ancillary business will eliminate one of "the bar's
most cherished prerogatives"-the right to self-regulation.122 They maintain
that ancillary activities focus lawyers' attentions too narrowly on their clients
at the expense of lawyers' commitment to public service,'2 and they fear
the government will necessarily step in to correct this oversight. Such a
state of affairs would spell disaster, they say, because one important role
of lawyers is to defend citizens against governmental tyranny.' u
However, this ominous prediction mistakenly assumes that ancillary busi-
ness and service to clients are mutually exclusive, when in fact the former
facilitates the latter. The legal profession need not fear the specter of
governmental regulation-so long as ancillary participants are willing to
compromise just as they want the opponents to. Participants must demon-
strate by their actions-instead of merely by words-that their arguments
in favor of ancillary activities are well-founded. In short, m pursuing
ancillary business they must exercise the restraint that all applicable ethics
codes demand of lawyers generally. In any jurisdiction that revises Model
Rule 5.4 to allow ancillary activities, diversified law firms must be careful
not to read a new rule's endorsement of their activities as license to forsake
their professionalism.
120. Id. at 409-10.
121. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967);
Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neigh-
bors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FouND. Rrs. J. 159, 215.
122. D. Block, supra note 10, at 23.
123. Id. at 24 ("When lawyers redefine themselves as merely 'problem-solvers' who provide
no umque contribution to society; who devote their energies primarily to profits and client
development; and who abdicate their traditional roles of improving the accessibility to, and
administration of justice, there will be no justification for preserving [the right to self-
regulation].").
124. Id. at 26.
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But so far, there is every indication that firms will not overstep these
boundaries. Diversified firms in the nation's capital are still participating in
bar activities, pursuing law reform, representing indigent clients and sup-
porting excellence in legal education. 125 In a report on ancillary business,
members of one of the largest diversified firms m D.C. astutely point out
that the greater threat to self-regulation is "overly zealous defense of the
bar's 'monopoly' and . the insularity of those who insist that only
lawyers are capable of ethical conduct."' 12
CONCLUSION
For all the questions left unanswered, there are some guarantees to revision
of Model Rule 5.4. The letter and spirit of the ethics codes will be more
closely obeyed, and all the other ethical rules will still hold lawyers to the
same high standards currently in force. And with nonlawyer professionals
handling the technical or foreign matters, lawyers will have more time to
devote to the questions of law involved in each case, although this also
may allow them more time to debate the nature of the legal profession.
The bipolar views of the legal profession today somehow seem more
compatible in light of an observation that sounds as applicable today as
when written in 1905 by Louis Brandeis. 127 'Lawyers are now to a greater
extent than formerly business men, a part of the great organized system of
industrial and financial enterprise. And they do not seem to be so much of
a distinct professional class." ' 28 Even if the realities of the profession are
changing, there can at least be some measure of security in the constancy
of the change.
Any specifics regarding the future of the legal profession are impossible
to predict. But the new D.C. rule seems to be just one more indication of
the general direction that change will inevitably take. A partner at D.C.'s
Arnold & Porter, the firm many consider to be the leader m ancillary
business ventures, declares that "successful law firms in 1995 will not be
practicing law in the same way that successful law firms practiced in
1980 "t129 In fact, he sees diversification as an ideal opportunity for
lawyers to rise to the top of the professional heap. In the years to come,
different professional groups called in to attack today's complex problems
will jockey for the position of control. All lawyers need to do to come out
on top, he says, is put to good use their skills for "assembling a large team
125. J. Jones, L. Sotsky & A. Friedrich, supra note 18, at 24.
126. Id.
127. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 304.
128. Id. (quoting L. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in LEGAL PRosFssioN: REsPoN-
sIBmrrY AND REGULATION 16 (G. Hazard & D. Rhode eds. 1985)).
129. Fitzpatnck, supra note 51, at 461.
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of specialists," "understanding the importance of schedule and priority"
and "the ability to think analytically, which is the province of lawyers." 1 0
Perhaps the bar should take one more lesson from the Stanley Report,
which reminds lawyers that "the legal profession is in a process of evolu-
tion.. . The challenge for individual lawyers and the organized Bar is to
understand these changes and to preserve those pnnciples of professionalism
which endure despite the changing legal landscape. 131 If lawyers begin to
understand and accept the changes ancillary business brings, perhaps per-
ceptions will be altered and the bar will behave a little differently, acting
both to preserve the profession's enduring principles and to accommodate
its newest ones.
130. Id. at 466.
131. Stanley Report, supra note 5, at 304.

